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CRIMINAL LAW-NO STITCHES FOR SNITCHES: THE NEED FOR A
DUTY-TO-REPORT LAW IN ARKANSAS
I. INTRODUCTION
"We do not have the ability to arrest people who witnessed the crime
and did nothing.... The law can be very rigid."'
Approximately twenty onlookers stopped to watch as a fifteen-year-old
California student was brutally gang raped outside of her school's home-
coming dance.2 For over two hours, witnesses watched, some even taking
pictures and videos of the attack with their cell phones, as multiple males
repeatedly kicked the teenage victim in the head while taking turns raping
her.3 Not a single witness, however, attempted to notify police.
4
In Pennsylvania, at least two witnesses separately observed assistant
college football coach Jerry Sandusky sexually assaulting young boys in a
Penn State locker room; yet, neither witness attempted to stop the assaults or
contact law enforcement.5 Two years after a custodian had witnessed
Sandusky performing oral sex on a young boy in the school's locker room,
graduate assistant Mike McQueary walked in to find Sandusky naked and
engaging in a sexual act with a ten-year-old boy in the locker room show-
1. Police: As Many as 20 Present at Gang Rape Outside School Dance, CNN (Oct. 27,
2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-10-27/justice/califomia.gang.rape.investigationI1 sus-
pects-arrest-police? s=PM:CRIME.html (statement by Richmond Police Lieutenant Mark
Gagan in response to public outcry after witnesses suffered no legal consequences in connec-
tion to Richmond High School gang rape).
2. Authorities believed there were as many as ten different attackers during the October
24, 2009 gang rape. Id. Existing laws prevented police from holding any of the witnesses
accountable. Id. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 152.3 (West Supp. 2012) (requiring witnesses
to report enumerated crimes when "the victim is a child under the age of 14").
3. Demian Bulwa, Witness in Richmond Gang Rape Turns Up Safe, S.F. CHRON. (Dec.
24, 2009), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/12/23/BAQ41B8PSA.DTL;
Emily Friedman, Gang Rape Witnesses Kept Silent So They Wouldn't Be Called Snitches,
ABC NEWS (Nov. 11, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/Health/witnesses-california-gang-
rape-scared-call-police/story?id=9054150#.T33LbWGm-8A.html.
4. Two witnesses explained to an ABC news station that they did not call police during
the attack because they did not want to be labeled snitches. See Friedman, supra note 3. In
response to this tragedy, the California Legislature proposed a bill that would require wit-
nesses to report crimes where the victim is less than eighteen years of age. S.B. 840, 2009-
2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010).
5. Complaint 25-31, at 36, Doe A v. Second Mile, No. 111102968 (Pa. Ct. C.P.,
Sept. 30, 2011), 2011 WL 5976014.
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ers. 6 McQueary looked into the shower several times while the assault was
taking place, yet did nothing to stop it and did not notify police.7
In Nevada, seven-year-old Sherrice Iverson was sexually assaulted and
murdered in a casino bathroom while her attacker's best friend, aware of
what was happening, failed to intervene or notify anyone.8 After watching
from an adjacent bathroom stall as Jeremy Strohmeyer molested the young
victim, David Cash, Jr. walked outside the restroom to wait as his friend
proceeded to murder her.9 Cash declined to report his friend to the authori-
ties. 0
In Massachusetts, spectators stood by and watched, some even cheer-
ing, 1 as Cheryl Ann Arauj o was gang raped on a pool table inside of a local
bar.'2 After dragging her across the barroom floor, kicking and screaming, at
least four different men took turns raping and restraining the twenty-two-
year-old victim, who could hear people "yelling [and] laughing, down near
the end of the bar."' 3 After finally escaping, "clothed only in a shirt and one
shoe," the victim ran into the street where she waved down a truck whose
passengers called the police from a pay phone nearby. "
In each of the cases described above, bystanders who witnessed the
crimes taking place not only failed to assist the victims, but failed to even
6. McQueary: I Saw Sandusky in a 'Wrong and Sexual' Act with Boy, MSNBC.cOM
(Dec. 16, 2011, 6:55 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45695764/ns/usnews-
crime and courts/t/mcqueary-i-saw-sandusky-wrong-sexual-act-boy/#.html.
7. Id. Later that night, McQueary called his father and told him he had seen Sandusky
doing something "wrong and sexual." Id. The next day, McQueary also informed head coach
Joe Patemo of what he had seen, but he did not give explicit details. Id. Neither McQueary's
father nor Patemo contacted police with the information McQueary had reported to them. Id.
8. Justin T. King, Comment, Criminal Law: "Am I My Brother's Keeper? " Sherrice 's
Law: A Balance ofAmerican Notions of Duty and Liberty, 52 OKLA. L. REv. 613, 614 (1999).
9. Id.; Cathy Booth Berkeley, The Bad Samaritan, TIME MAG., June 24, 2001,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,139892,00.html. See also Andrew D.
Kaplan, Comment, "Cash-Ing Out": Regulating Omissions, Analysis of the Sherrice Iverson
Act, 26 NEw ENG. J. ON CrIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 67, 67 (2000).
10. King, supra note 8, at 614 ("[Cash] never mentioned [the incident] to anyone until
Strohmeyer was caught."). In fact, Cash had only one question for his friend: "Had the little
girl been aroused?" Berkeley, supra note 9.
11. Cheering on an attacker is considered aiding and abetting in some states, which
could subject witnesses who encouraged criminal conduct to accomplice liability charges. See
Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of Affirmative
Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 22 n.105 (1993). Witnesses who watched but
never cheered or encouraged the attackers, however, would not be subject to any legal conse-
quences in most states. See id. at 21-22.
12. Id. at21.
13. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Cordeiro, 519 N.E.2d 1328, 1329 (Mass. 1988);
Commonwealth v. Vieira, 519 N.E.2d 1320, 1321 (Mass. 1988).
14. Jay Pateakos, Brothers Break Silence in Big Dan's Rape Case, HERALDNEWS.COM
(Oct. 25, 2009), http://www.heraldnews.com/news/localnews/x665149028/After-26-years-
brothers-break-silence?zc_p=0.html; Vieira, 519 N.E.2d at 1321.
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report what they had witnessed to law enforcement. None of those witness-
es, however, faced any legal consequences for their lack of assistance, as
they had no legal duty to act. In cases such as these, public outrage over the
inability to prosecute those witnesses who stood by and did nothing has of-
ten led to wide media coverage, which has, in almost every case, resulted in
proposed state legislation that would criminalize such inaction in the fu-
ture. 5
Traditionally, absent a special relationship, individuals have never had
a duty to assist a person in need.16 In response to the heinous crimes depict-
ed above, however, many states have enacted statutes that hold witnesses
criminally liable for failing to report crimes to authorities and, in some
states, for failing to assist crime victims.' 7 Though not quite "Good Samari-
tan" laws,'" reporting statutes require a witness to simply notify authorities
or emergency personnel when a crime victim is in need. "9
The conduct of inactive witnesses who stand idly by while brutal rapes,
sexual assaults, beatings, and murders are occurring is deplorable. The prob-
lem of how to get witnesses to step up and act, however, is a difficult one.
Every state, including Arkansas, would be well served by implementing
laws that would require individuals to notify law enforcement officers when
15. In a matter of days after news broke of the Penn State scandal, Pennsylvania legisla-
tors began considering legislation that would mandate child sexual abuse reporting by state
employees. See Stacie Rumenap, Child Abuse Scandal Prompts Lawmakers to Weigh In,
INSIDE ALEC, 16 (Feb. 2012), http://www.alec.org/docs/Feb20l2_InsideALEC. See also
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (West 2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.882 (West
2000); S.B. 840, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (proposed legislation in response to
Richmond High gang rape).
16. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 56 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
17. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.56.765, 11.56.767 (2010); CAL. PENAL CODE § 152.3
(West Supp. 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-115 (2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.027 (West
2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.6 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Act 235); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 2010); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 202.882 (West 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (LexisNexis 2010);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-1-5.1, 11-56-1 (2002); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.17 (West 2011);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.69.100 (West 2010); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 2005).
18. The common law "Good Samaritan" doctrine typically imposes an affirmative duty
on individuals to rescue or provide assistance to a person in need. See King, supra note 8, at
619. In many states, however, statutes labeled as "Good Samaritan" laws are actually statutes
that provide immunity from liability to rescuers who voluntarily render assistance during an
emergency. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-101 (LEXIS Repl. 2010). For a detailed discus-
sion of Good Samaritan statutes, see Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Construction and Ap-
plication of "Good Samaritan" Statutes, 68 A.L.R. 4TH 294 (1989).
19. See Sandra Guerra Thompson, The White-Collar Police Force: "Duty to Report"
Statutes in Criminal Law Theory, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 3, 35-36 (2002) ("Reporting
laws create a variant of Good Samaritan laws by requiring individuals to assist victims-or
the general public-by conveying information about possible harms or injuries to the appro-
priate government agencies.").
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they witness specifically enumerated offenses. It should not take a horrific
tragedy like those depicted above for the Arkansas Legislature to enact such
a reporting statute.
This note will examine duty-to-report statutes and address their poten-
tial for enactment in Arkansas. First, Part II will discuss the common law
history of the no-duty-to-aid principle, as well as duty-to-assist laws in other
jurisdictions and current Arkansas reporting statutes. Part III will then exam-
ine the need for a specifically enumerated duty-to-report law in Arkansas
and will propose a statute for consideration by the Arkansas Legislature.
Part IV will address the imposition of both civil and criminal liability for
violating such a reporting statute, along with potential problems facing the
proposed statute's enforceability. Finally, Part V will conclude by discuss-
ing the likelihood of such a statute being enacted in Arkansas.
II. HISTORY OF No-DUTY-TO-AID LAW
A. No Traditional Duty to Rescue
It is a well-settled principle in law that "[t]he fact that [a person] realiz-
es or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or
protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action. '2°
Thus, absent a special relationship, 21 an individual who makes no attempt to
help a stranger in need, even at no risk of harm to himself, cannot be pun-
ished for failing to assist the stranger, unless the legislature has enacted a
duty-to-assist statute. 22 The oft-quoted hypothetical of the Olympic swim-
mer walking by a swimming pool and declining to rescue a drowning baby
has illustrated this principle for many years.23 Additionally, opinions dating
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965). See also James Barr Ames, Law
and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 112 (1908).
21. See Yeager, supra note 11, at 9-10 (examples of special relationships creating a
legal duty to assist include parent-child; husband-wife; and master-servant); PROSSER &
KEATON ON TORTS, supra note 16, §§ 56-57 (The law imposes a duty to aid on special rela-
tionships such as parent-child or employer-employee because one person has control over the
other). See generally Estate of Cilley v. Lane, 985 A.2d 481, 487 (Me. 2009) (discussing the
"affirmative duty to aid or warn another person in peril"). The appellant in Cilley urged the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court to adopt the witnessing of an injury as a new type of special
relationship. Id. In declining to do so, the court stated that such a "relationship ... is unlike
any other relationship recognized as sufficient to create a duty of care." Id. at 488.
22. Thompson, supra note 19, at 37. See also Young v. Gastro-Intestinal Ctr., Inc., 361
Ark. 209, 225, 205 S.W.3d 741, 752 (2005) (Imber, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is well established in
most jurisdictions that a person has no duty to warn or rescue another unless a special rela-
tionship between the two creates such a duty.").
23. See, e.g., DANIEL KATKIN, THE NATURE OF CRIMINAL LAW: ESSAYS, CASES, AND
OTHER MATERIALS 28 (Henry M. Staat ed., 1982).
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back to the 1800s have reiterated the no-duty-to-rescue rule, 24 and courts
often articulate their reasoning using anecdotes of young children in situa-
tions of peril.
25
The law has typically been reluctant to punish failures to act, preferring
to impose liability on those who act affirmatively rather than on those who
merely allow an act to occur.2 6 As predicted by authors of the Restatement
of Torts, however, "such extreme cases of morally outrageous and indefen-
sible conduct" have occurred that some states have ultimately eliminated the
traditional no-duty-to-assist rule.27 State legislators have been steadily enact-
ing an increasing number of laws that place upon individuals the duty to
assist victims of crime, namely by reporting the crimes they witness to au-
thorities."
24. See generally Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058, 1058 (Ind. 1901) (physician not
liable for refusing to treat patient); People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128, 1131 (Mich. 1907)
(quoting United States v. Knowles, 26 F. Cas. 800, 801 (N.D. Cal. 1864)) (..it is undoubtedly
the moral duty of every person to extend to others assistance when in danger ... and, if such
efforts should be omitted by any one when they could be made without imperiling his own
life, he would, by his conduct, draw upon himself the just censure and reproach of good men;
but this is the only punishment to which he would be subjected by society'); Buch v. Amory
Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 811 (N.H. 1898) ("The situation of the adult in front of secret dangers..
. and that of the infant incapable of comprehending danger, is, in a legal aspect, exactly the
same."); Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959) (The fact that the defendant merely
saw the plaintiff in a position of peril, but was not responsible for placing him in that perilous
position, imposed upon the defendant no legal duty of rescue).
25. See Buch, 44 A. at 810-11. A stranger is not liable for a young child's injuries or
death if he fails to rescue the child, who lies on a railroad track in the path of an approaching
car, even when he can do so without endangering himself. Id. at 810. A stranger is also not
liable in damages, nor punishable by law, where he does not rescue his neighbor's two-year-
old who is dangerously close to the machinery of a windmill in his yard. Id. at 811. But see
John C. Moorhouse et al., Law & Economics and Tort Law: A Survey of Scholarly Opinion,
62 ALB. L. REv. 667, 680 (1998) ("[A]lthough first year law students are commonly torment-
ed by hypotheticals concerning the wisdom of imposing a duty to rescue infants toddling in
front of speeding trucks on those who could attempt a rescue at no danger to themselves, such
cases make up a small minority of actual rescue opinions.").
26. JOEL SAMAHA, CRIMINAL LAW 87 (5th ed. 1996).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c (1965) (noting that extremely moral-
ly reprehensible conduct would inevitably take place one day, causing states to reconsider the
traditional rule).
28. Thompson, supra note 19, at 5. See also Estate of Cilley v. Lane, 985 A.2d 481, 488
(Me. 2009) (noting that some states have adopted duty-to-assist laws "[i]n response to a few
notorious instances of bystander inaction").
20121
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B. Duties Imposed in Other Jurisdictions
1. States Imposing a Duty to Rescue
Only four states have enacted "[t]rue Good Samaritan criminal statutes
that impose a duty to rescue another., 29 Minnesota, Rhode Island, Vermont,
and Wisconsin require a witness to rescue or to provide assistance to a vic-
tim in situations where the witness knows the victim is being exposed to
physical harm.3" States mandating that a witness render assistance exempt
the witness from this duty where doing so would put the witness in danger.31
2. States Imposing a Duty to Report
In addition to those states imposing a duty to rescue, legislatures have
also gradually "threaded our criminal codes with laws requiring people to
assist the police by disclosing their knowledge of certain crimes. 32 General
duty-to-rescue laws are notably different from those that mandate the report-
ing of a witnessed crime. Specifically, reporting statutes require only that a
witness contact authorities, as opposed to intervening in an attack to rescue a
victim. 33 Pursuant to a duty-to-report statute, upon reporting the crime, a
witness can leave the actual intervention to a law enforcement officer.34
29. Thompson, supra note 19, at 37 n.188.
30. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (2002); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 2005) (requiring witness to
either provide assistance or summon law enforcement officers or other assistance).
31. See supra note 30. See also, e.g., State v. Joyce, 433 A.2d 271, 273 (Vt. 1981) (hold-
ing that the Vermont statute does not create a duty to intervene in a fight since doing so
would cause danger to the rescuer).
32. Thompson, supra note 19, at 9. "The most recent reporting statutes apply to all eye-
witnesses who might be in a position to aid a crime victim during or immediately after the
commission of the offense, thus creating a variant of a true 'duty to rescue' statute." Id at 11.
See also S.B. 840, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (Bill Analysis) (where the Cali-
fornia District Attorneys Association recognized that the goal of the proposed legislation,
which would have amended California's current duty-to-report law in order to require report-
ing in more instances, was to "increase the frequency with which terrible crimes are reported
to law enforcement"), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_0801-
0850/sb_840_cfa_20100803_161326asm comm.html.
33. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.56.765, 11.56.767 (2010); CAL PENAL CODE § 152.3
(West Supp. 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-115 (2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.027
(West 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.6 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Act 235); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (West 2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.882 (West 2000);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (LexisNexis 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-1-5.1 (2002); TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.171 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.69.100 (West 2010).
34. King, supra note 8, at 637.
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C. Arkansas Reporting Statutes
Unlike the minority of states that have enacted some form of duty-to-
assist legislation, Arkansas legislators have not yet adopted a general duty to
rescue or to report crimes.35 In keeping with the rest of the nation, however,
the Arkansas General Assembly has enacted specific reporting statutes re-
garding child abuse, elder abuse, knife and gunshot wound treatment, and
crimes committed on school grounds.
1. ChildAbuse Reporting
The Child Maltreatment Act36 codifies thirty-seven types of individuals
as mandated reporters37 who are required to immediately report suspected
child maltreatment or death as a result of child maltreatment.38 The Arkan-
sas Supreme Court has referred to the Act as "imposing a compelling duty
on the classes of persons named therein to act."39 In addition to mandated
reporters, the Act also provides that any person may immediately report to
the Child Abuse Hotline if he or she suspects child abuse."a The
expresspurpose behind mandating the reporting of suspected child abuse is
the protection of children in Arkansas.4'
2. Elder Abuse Reporting
Similar to the Child Maltreatment Act, the Adult and Long-Term Care
Facility Resident Maltreatment Act provides a list of twenty-six classes of
persons and officials who are required by law to report suspected elder
35. The Arkansas Legislature has, however, codified a statutory duty to render assis-
tance to a law enforcement officer upon the officer's command. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-54-
109(a) (LEXIS Repl. 2005). "Refusing to assist a law enforcement officer is a Class C mis-
demeanor." Id. § 5-54-109(b). Arkansas has also statutorily imposed a duty on "[t]he driver
of any [motor] vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person ..
• [to] remain at the scene of the accident for a reasonable time" and to render assistance to
injured parties if needed. Id. § 27-53-103(a)(2), (b)(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2010). Failure to comply
with this statute is a Class D felony. Id. § 27-53-101(b)(1).
36. Id. §§ 12-18-101 to -1108 (LEXIS Repl. 2009&Supp. 2011).
37. Id. § 12-18-402(b) (LEXIS Supp. 2011).
38. Id. § 12-18-402(a). The term "child maltreatment" is defined as "abuse, sexual
abuse, neglect, sexual exploitation, or abandonment." Id. § 12-18-103(6) (LEXIS Supp.
2011). "Abuse" includes conduct creating a "serious threat of death, .... disfigurement, or
impairment of any bodily organ." Id. § 12-18-103(2)(A)(ii).
39. Cundiffv. Crider, 303 Ark. 120, 122, 792 S.W.2d 604, 605 (1990).
40. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-401 (LEXIS Repl. 2009). A mandated reporter's deliberate
failure to comply with the Act and report suspected abuse is a Class A misdemeanor. Id. §
12-18-201(b). Commission of this offense may also result in civil liability. Id. § 12-18-206.
41. Id. § 12-18-102 (LEXIS Supp. 2011).
2012]
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abuse.4 2 Along with those persons required to report, the statute adds that
any other person may report abuse if he or she has witnessed the abuse or
has a reasonable suspicion that an adult has been maltreated.43 Much like the
mandated reporting of suspected child abuse, the Arkansas General
Assemblyhas declared that part of its purpose in enacting the laws that re-
quire reporting of suspected adult maltreatment is to protect maltreated
adults in Arkansas.44
3. Knife and Gunshot Wound Reporting
In addition to the child maltreatment and elder maltreatment reporting
statutes, Arkansas law also requires all physicians and other persons that
provide first aid treatment to report all cases in which they treat intentionally
inflicted knife or gunshot wounds to the county sheriffs office or municipal
law enforcement agency.45 When originally enacted, the emergency clause
accompanying this statute indicated that the legislative intent behind this
reporting statute was to "curtail crime and assist peace officers in [the] per-
formance of their duties. 46 The emergency clause further described the re-
porting of knife and gunshot injuries as "being necessary for the health,
peace, and safety of the public. 47
4. Reporting Crimes Committed on School Grounds
Along with mandating the reporting of abuse and treatment of certain
injuries, Arkansas has also enacted a statute that places a duty upon public
school principals to report crimes that occur on school property. 48 Section 6-
17-113(b) of the Arkansas Code provides that any public school principal
who has knowledge or "a reasonable belief that any person has committed
or has threatened to commit an act of violence or any crime involving a
deadly weapon on school property or while under school supervision" must
report such crime to law enforcement authorities.49
42. Id. § 12-12-1708(a)(1) (LEXIS Repl. 2009).
43. Id. § 12-12-1708(a)(3).
44. Id. § 12-12-1702 (LEXIS Repl. 2007). The offense of failure to report suspected
elder abuse in the first degree is a Class B misdemeanor. Id. § 12-12-1720(a)(2).
45. Id. § 12-12-602(a)(1), (b)(l)-(2) (LEXIS Supp. 2011).
46. Act of Mar. 8, 1949, No. 258 § 4, 1949 Ark. Acts 769-70 (codified as amended at
ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-601 to 603). Failure to report under this statute is a violation pun-
ishable by a fine of no more than $100. Id. § 12-12-601 (LEXIS Repl. 2009).
47. Act of Mar. 8, 1949, No. 258 § 4, 1949 Ark. Acts 769-70 (codified as amended at
ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-601 to -603).
48. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-17-113(b) (LEXIS Repl. 2007).
49. Id. § 6-17-113(b). Failure to comply with this statute is a Class C misdemeanor. Id. §
6-17-113(d).
[Vol. 34
DUTY-TO-REPORT LAW IN ARKANSAS
III. ENACTING A GENERAL DUTY-TO-REPORT STATUTE IN ARKANSAS
A. Public Policy
The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that providing in-
formation for the assistance of law enforcement is "an act of responsible
citizenship."5 Others have noted that "[w]itnessing a crime and ignoring the
plight of the victim is antisocial behavior and therefore a public wrong."5'
Furthermore, although some commentators have criticized laws that attempt
to "legislate morality," many others agree that "our nation should not permit
its citizens to act, or fail to act, with callous indifference."5
One author has maintained that rather than "coercing kindness" in gen-
eral, the government "should require an individual to confer a benefit on
another only when the value of the benefit sufficiently outweighs the cost of
providing it."53 Child and elder abuse reporting statutes, for example, shed
some light on this theory. Generally, laws requiring certain persons to report
suspected child or adult abuse have been accepted as a legitimate use of
government control because society gains a significant benefit (the protec-
tion of its children and elderly) at an acceptable cost (deprivation of the
freedom to not report suspected abuse). "
Applying this theory to general duty-to-report statutes, the results are
much the same. The benefits conferred on society by a statutory duty to re-
port certain crimes, namely, the saving of lives and effective crime control,
are significant. The value of these benefits likewise outweighs the cost,
which is essentially the deprivation of the freedom to refuse to notify police
when a crime victim is in danger.5 Thus, under this theory, statutes requir-
ing witnesses to report crimes to authorities are also a legitimate use of gov-
erinent control.
While government intrusion on an individual's freedom to act or not to
act requires a legitimate government interest, protecting the public safety
has historically constituted such an interest. 6 "[T]he prevention of crime
and minimizing the adverse effects thereof' are necessarily included in this
50. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966); see also Roberts v. United States,
445 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1980) ("[G]ross indifference to the duty to report known criminal
behavior remains a badge of irresponsible citizenship.").
51. Jennifer Bagby, Note, Justifications for State Bystander Intervention Statutes: Why
Crime Witnesses Should Be Required to Call for Help, 33 IND. L. REv. 571, 583 (2000).
52. King, supra note 8, at 617.
53. Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 423, 430 (1985).
54. Id. at 430-31.
55. Id. at431.
56. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-902 (LEXIS Repl. 2009).
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legitimate governmental interest in public safety.57 Much like the rationale
underlying Arkansas's knife and gunshot wound reporting statute, one rea-
son for requiring witnesses to report serious crimes "is that effective crime
prevention and law enforcement depend significantly on the cooperation of
the public." 58 It has been noted that "as victims and witnesses, citizens have
a virtual monopoly over information about who did what, and this tight con-
trol extends over almost all . . . crimes." 59 As such, the implications for
crime control would be considerable if witnesses would become more in-
volved as bystanders.6 ° By requiring witnesses to report crimes to authori-
ties, Arkansas's criminal justice system would be able to more effectively
"fulfill its role in aiding the victims of crime and stopping criminal acts."'"
B. Ease of Reporting
In addition to its positive public policy implications, an Arkansas re-
porting statute is necessary because "[t]here is probably nothing easier than
reporting."" Unlike duty-to-rescue statutes, duty-to-report laws do not re-
quire a witness to directly intervene during an attack. Instead, reporting stat-
utes require witnesses to simply place a phone call to police.63
In response to an attack during which ten witnesses ignored a victim's
pleas for help while the victim was being assaulted, one police spokesperson
commented that if people are "not comfortable [because they] don't feel
capable of intervening, that's fine .... But not calling is not understanda-
ble."' After the highly publicized murder of Kitty Genovese, during which
thirty-seven people, aware of the ongoing attack, refused to assist or even
57. Melody J. Stewart, How Making the Failure to Assist Illegal Fails to Assist: An
Observation of Expanding Criminal Omission Liability, 25 Am. J. CRIM. L. 385,415 (1998).
58. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (LexisNexis 2010). See also Jack Wenik, Note,
Forcing Bystander to Get Involved: Case for Statute Requiring Witnesses to Report Crime,
94 YALE L.J. 1787, 1794 (1985) ("Non-legal means, such as publicity campaigns and re-
wards, have proven insufficient in encouraging crime reporting, perhaps because only those
who are already willing to report crimes can be reached by noncoercive measures.").
59. WESLEY G. SKOGAN, Making Better Use of Victims and Witnesses, in POLICE
LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA 332, 334 (William Geller ed., 1985), available at
http://skogan.org/files/MakingBetter-Use-of VictimWitness.Geller.pdf.
60. See id. at 332.
61. Bagby, supra note 51, at 581.
62. Kaplan, supra note 9, at 79 (citing Yeager, supra note 11, at 24).
63. Because of the lack of physical intervention required under a duty-to-report statute,
"some argue that the case for reporting laws is stronger than that for duty-to-rescue laws."
Thompson, supra note 19, at 40. Even opponents of general duty-to-assist laws have agreed
that "[c]rime-reporting ... statutes are more appropriate forms of governmentally persuaded
actions." Stewart, supra note 57, at 414.
64. Patrick Condon, Witnesses Ignore Woman's Pleas for Help, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS,
Aug. 24, 2007, at A3.
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call for help, one New York detective described how easy it would have
been to contact police.65 The officer stated that "[a] phone call would have
done it."
66
C. Preparation for Future Tragedy
Most states that have enacted duty-to-assist laws have done so in re-
sponse to tragic incidents such as those mentioned in the introduction of this
note. 67 The fact that such a horrific attack has yet to be reported in Arkansas,
however, does not mean that one will not occur or that existing laws should
remain unexamined or unchanged. 68 Despite one Maine trial court judge's
claim that "shocking cases where one human being sits idle during another's
peril are difficult to find, ' 69 news stories and case law indicate to the contra-
ry." Instances of rape or assault of a victim in front of passive witnesses are
not only legion, but they also typically involve multiple witnesses, rather
than just one individual bystander.7 Advocating for the passage of a federal
reporting statute that would hold witnesses criminally liable for failing to
report sexual crimes against children, Representative Nick Lampson ex-
plained that "' [w]ith crimes against children on the rise, this type of legisla-
tion is more important than ever before."' 72
Even though Arkansas courts have yet to be faced with the issue of by-
stander indifference in this state, nothing prohibits the Arkansas Legislature
65. Martin Gansberg, 37 Who Saw Murder Didn't Call the Police, N.Y. TIMES, March
17, 1964, at Al, 38.
66. Id. at A38.
67. See supra Part I.
68. See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON, WOULD YOU CONVICT? SEVENTEEN CASES THAT
CHALLENGED THE LAW 82, 217 (1999) (describing correction of law's weakness as proper
accommodation of the tension between the demands for legality and justice).
69. Cilley v. Lane, No. CV-06-009, 2009 WL 558273 (Me. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2009)
(Trial Court Order).
70. See, e.g., MICHAEL W. BROOKS, SUBWAY CITY: RIDING THE TRAINS, READING NEW
YORK 194 (1997) (eleven witnesses looked on as seventeen-year-old Andrew Mormile was
stabbed on a train and bled to death; not a single person attempted to help); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOrr JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3 n.70 (2d ed. 1986) (quoting NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 22, 1983, at 5) (a fourteen-year-old St. Louis girl was raped for over forty minutes
while bystanders did nothing until an eleven-year-old boy finally called police); Stewart,
supra note 57, at 390 (although four different people were aware that Joey Levick lay beaten
in a drainage ditch for fifteen hours, none of them attempted to assist him; he eventually died
in a two-inch puddle of water).
71. See supra note 70; S.B. 840, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (Bill Analysis),
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_0801-
0850/sb 840 cfa 20100803 161326 asm comm.html.
72. Kaplan, supra note 9, at 78 (quoting Press Release, United States House of Repre-
sentatives, Lampson to Introduce Federal "Good Samaritan" Legislation (Sept. 2, 1998)) (on
file with author).
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from preemptively enacting legislation. In fact, the Arkansas General
Assemblyhas previously enacted statutes without Arkansas courts having to
first adjudicate the particular issues such laws were designed to address.73
Rather than waiting until problems arise in Arkansas, legislators have react-
ed proactively to issues brought to light by cases in other states by arming
prosecutors with criminal statutes to be applied if similar, unfortunate
crimes occur in this state. For instance, in 1993, Arkansas followed the na-
tional trend when it enacted a criminal stalking statute74 in response to the
California murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer by her stalker, Robert
Bardo." Arkansas again joined a majority of the states when it enacted the
Sex Offender Registration Act of 199776 after the highly publicized death of
seven-year-old Megan Kanka, who was brutally raped and murdered by a
convicted sex offender who lived in her New Jersey neighborhood.77
As more and more cases of bystander indifference haunt news head-
lines around the nation, Arkansas's need to address the issue becomes great-
er. Because the Arkansas Legislature has exhibited its willingness to enact
laws in response to crimes that have taken place outside of the state, the fact
that incidents such as those that have occurred in California, Pennsylvania,
Nevada, and Massachusetts have yet to be reported in Arkansas should not
preclude legislators from enacting a statute that would preemptively address
the problem of witness indifference in this state.
D. A Proposed Duty-to-Report Statute for Arkansas
Common themes among existing duty-to-assist and duty-to-report stat-
utes include: that a witness must have the ability to assist or report without
73. It is not uncommon for state legislatures to enact statutes in response to incidents
that have occurred in other states but not yet in their own. See LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note
70 (sponsor of Minnesota's proposed duty-to-assist legislation stated that he was moved to
introduce the bill by reports of the barroom gang rape that took place in New Bedford, Mas-
sachusetts earlier that year where spectators stood by, some of them repeatedly shouting "go
for it!").
74. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-229 (LEXIS Supp. 2011).
75. See Joseph C. Merschman, Note, The Dark Side of the Web: Cyberstalking and the
Need for Contemporary Legislation, 24 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 255, 263, 266 (2001). After this
dramatic murder brought national attention to the problem of stalking, stalking statutes swept
the country, and by 1995, they had been enacted by every state. Id. at 266.
76. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-901 to -924 (LEXIS Rep]. 2009 and Supp. 2011).
77. Mary-Marsha Porter Loe, Note, Arkansas Sexual Offender Registration and Notifi-
cation Laws: An Ex Post Facto Violation?, 53 ARK. L. REv. 175, 177-78 (2000) (attributing
the nationwide "explosion of registration and notification laws" to the shocking 1994 New
Jersey murder). By 1997, forty-eight states had enacted sex offender registration statutes; of
those statutes, almost half contained community notification provisions. See id. at 178 (citing
Chrisandrea L. Turner, Note, Convicted Sex Offenders v. Our Children: Whose Interests
Deserve the Greater Protection?, 86 KY. L. 477,479-80 (1997).
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harming himself or others;78 that a witness is immune from civil liability for
assisting or reporting;79 and that the witness must know or reasonably
should know that a victim is in peril.8" In keeping with these themes, a pro-
posed duty-to-report statute for Arkansas follows:
(1) Any person who knows that a crime is being committed and that a
victim is exposed to bodily harm shall notify law enforcement officers or
other assistance personnel. A person need not comply with this subsec-
tion under the following circumstances:
(a) Compliance would place him or her in danger;
(b) Compliance would interfere with any duties the person
owes to others;
(c) Assistance is being summoned or provided by others; or
(d) The crime or alleged crime has been reported to an appro-
priate law enforcement agency by others.
(2) Any person who, in good faith, reports or provides other reasonable
assistance under this section is immune from civil liability for his or her
acts or omissions in providing the assistance. This immunity does not
apply if the person receives or expects to receive compensation for
providing the assistance.
The offense of failing to report a crime would likely be best classified
as a misdemeanor. According to one commentator, "imposing only a limited
penalty is essential to the success of a novel statute that proposes to alter
traditional modes of behavior." 81 Moreover, classification as a misdemeanor
would be consistent with existing Arkansas reporting statutes.8 2
IV. POTENTIAL ENFORCEABILITY PROBLEMS
Although duty-to-report laws have been successfully enacted in several
states, the statutes' opponents often highlight many criticisms regarding
78. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
79. But see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2002) (no immunity from civil liability where
assistance amounts to gross negligence).
80. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. But see ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-53-101
(LEXIS Repl. 2010) (containing no element requiring driver's knowledge of victim's inju-
ries).
81. Wenik, supra note 58, at 1800 n.99.
82. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-201(b) (LEXIS Repl. 2009) (first degree failure to
report suspected child abuse is a Class A misdemeanor); id. § 12-12-1720(a)(2) (first degree
failure to report suspected elder abuse is a Class B misdemeanor); id. § 6-17-113(d) (LEXIS
Repl. 2007) (failure to report crime on school property is a Class C misdemeanor).
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enforcement of the duty. Along with contending that duty-to-report laws are,
and would be, rarely enforced by prosecutors, some critics argue that identi-
fying witnesses who have failed to assist those in need would be almost im-
possible. In the event that a witness who failed to report a crime could be
identified, an additional problem arguably facing prosecutors is proving that
the witness had actual knowledge of the victim's need for help. Finally,
some commentators have argued against the enactment of a duty-to-report
statute simply because they find it to be ineffective.
A. Lack of Actual Enforcement
According to a trial court judge in Maine, one problem with adopting a
duty-to-report statute "is that applying such a duty would be nearly impossi-
ble."83 Even in jurisdictions where statutes mandate a duty to assist, accord-
ing to the judge, "such statutes have not been often applied," as is evidenced
by the small number of prosecutions that take place.84 Instances such as one
that occurred in Minnesota, where ten witnesses went unpunished after ig-
noring a victim's screams during a ninety-minute attack, support this argu-
ment.85 According to one commentator, "the lack of prosecutions under ex-
isting [duty-to-assist statutes] suggests that, at least in prosecutors' minds,
such failures to rescue or report are not loudly crying for retribution."'86
On the other hand, some prosecutors have indicated that the lack of ap-
plication may not be a reluctance to prosecute "but instead a combination of
'thankfully few incidents such as the [Massachusetts] case and an inability
83. Cilley v. Lane, No. CV-06-009, 2009 WL 558273 (Me. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2009)
(Trial Court Order).
84. Id. See also Kaplan, supra note 9, at 92. It has been further noted that most prosecu-
tors especially do not invoke their reporting laws against non-reporters who are not profes-
sionals within a class of mandated reporters. Thompson, supra note 19, at 16.
85. See Cilley, 2009 WL 558273. Even though Minnesota has adopted a duty-to-assist
statute, no action was taken against the bystanders who did not summon help. But see State v.
LaPlante, 521 N.W.2d 448 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). In LaPlante, the Wisconsin Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the conviction of Kaie LaPlante for violating Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.34
(West 2005), the failure-to-aid statute, when she failed to either help or call for assistance as
she witnessed Monica Hendy being brutally beaten by seven other people outside of a party
at LaPlante's home. Id. at 449, 452. "[LaPlante] was fined $300 and ordered to perform
community service." Eli Sanders, Good Samaritan Law a Mother's Mission, SEA17LE TIMES,
Feb. 11, 2001,
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20010211 &slug=goodsaml 1 m.
See also Mom Given Probation for Videotaped Beating, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 15, 2003,
http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl/2003 3627043/mom-given-probation-for-
videotaped-beating.html (woman convicted of failing to report child abuse where security
camera captured her sister, Madelyn Toogood, repeatedly hitting and shaking Toogood's
daughter).
86. Eugene Volokh, Duties to Rescue and the Anticooperative Effects of Law, 88 GEO.
L.J. 105, 111 (1999).
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to identify perpetrators in those reported cases where the statute does apply,'
as well as the problematical nature of coercing testimony from crucial wit-
nesses, that accounts for the dearth of precedent on point."87 Noting that
Arkansas has not experienced such a heinous crime as that which occurred
in Massachusetts, one Arkansas prosecuting attorney stated, "As a prosecu-
tor, part of my job is to abide by the law of the State of Arkansas. If a statute
is enacted, I shall use it as often as I am required to."88
Even if violations of a duty-to-report statute were rarely prosecuted in
Arkansas, the statute could still serve an important purpose as the basis of
civil claims against witnesses for failure to report.8 9 Criminal statutes have
often had a role in establishing civil liability.9" Some states, including Ar-
kansas, have determined that the statutorily imposed duties to report child
and elder abuse, which were enacted as criminal laws, also give rise to civil
causes of action.9 In fact, the primary use of some criminal reporting stat-
utes is to impose civil liability upon non-reporting witnesses by creating a
legal duty under criminal law.92
Using the criminal statute for the purpose of allowing claimants to
bring civil suits could potentially be more effective than using it to prose-
cute witnesses who fail to assist."3 One reason for this is that "[m]any people
rightly fear the risk of civil liability, which could mean the loss of all the
assets that they've worked for years to accumulate, even more than [they
fear] the risk of prosecution under a rarely enforced misdemeanor statute." 94
Furthermore, enforcing the statute civilly would likely result in more suc-
cessful suits because a civil claim requires a lower burden of proof than a
criminal suit.95
87. Yeager, supra note 11, at 35.
88. Email from Vicky Ewenike, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Pulaski Cnty., Ark., to
author (Feb. 20, 2011) (on file with author).
89. See Stewart, supra note 57, at 426 (noting that while "a vast increase in criminal
prosecutions under duty-to-aid statutes" is unlikely, the statutes may generate increased civil
litigation).
90. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 70, § 1.3.
91. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-206 (LEXIS Repl. 2009); id. § 12-12-1706; see also
Thompson, supra note 19, at 16.
92. Thompson, supra note 19, at 7 ("Non-reporters of child abuse, for example, are
rarely prosecuted, but often are sued."). See also SAMAHA, supra note 26, at 88 (noting that
the failure to perform legal duties is a criminal omission, but failure to perform moral duties
is not).
93. See EDWARD ELDEFONSO & ALAN R. COFFEY, CRIMINAL LAW: HISTORY,
PmLOsOmsy, ENFORCEMENT 38 (John L. Michel ed., 1981) (explaining that civil liability and
other non-criminal penalties carry the brunt of controlling conduct, with "a little additional
force contributed by infrequently used criminal provisions that may appear in statute books").
94. Volokh, supra note 86, at 112.
95. For civil claims, the burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, even though
the action may involve criminal conduct. United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 48 (1914).
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B. Identifying Witnesses Who Have Failed to Assist
Prosecutorial difficulty in identifying those individuals who witnessed
a crime but failed to report it is another possible hurdle facing enactment of
a duty-to-report statute in Arkansas. 96 Some critics argue that witnesses who
failed to report crimes would be difficult to identify and trace, especially if
their failure to report was not witnessed by anyone else. 9'
For some crimes, however, such as the one that occurred at Richmond
High School, identifying these witnesses may not be as difficult as critics
perceive. During the Richmond High attack, which took place in the
school's courtyard, over a dozen witnesses were present, some of whom
were recognized as classmates of the victim.98 One witness to the gang rape
informed news reporters that he "knew at least one of the attackers." 99 In
addition to the significant number of witnesses present, cell phone cameras
were also used to capture parts of the attack, which likely captured photos of
some of the witnesses as well. 100 Although not every crime will have such a
considerable number of witnesses as the Richmond High School incident,
the difficulty of identifying witnesses of those crimes that do will be greatly
diminished.
C. Proving Witness Had Knowledge of Victim's Need for Aid
A third potential problem with the enforceability of a duty-to-report
statute is that it may be difficult for prosecutors to establish that a witness
who failed to report actually knew of the victim's injury or peril. 101 The bur-
Criminal claims, on the other hand, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
96. See generally David A. Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on
the Duty to Rescue, 84 TEX. L, REv. 653, 712-14 (2006). Hyman argues that "[t]he willing-
ness of average Americans to rescue one another is typically discounted or dismissed entire-
ly." Id. at 663. Hyman uses stories such as that of Lillian Robinson, a woman who was saved
from being killed by a train by Marsha Cozier, to illustrate this point. Id. at 698. Hyman
argues that Cozier's actions are "much more representative of the real world of rescue." Id. at
699. Typical duty-to-report statutes, however, as well as the proposed Arkansas statute, are
geared toward witnesses of violent crimes, who stand idly by and watch, without reporting
anything to authorities, as opposed to being directed at those who do not risk their lives to
save people endangered by accidents. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text; supra
Part III.D.
97. See Robert Justin Lipkin, Comment, Beyond Good Samaritans and Moral Monsters:
An Individualistic Justification of the General Legal Duty to Rescue, 31 UCLA L. REv. 252,
270-72 (1983); Silver, supra note 53, at 433.
98. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
99. Friedman, supra note 3.
100. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
101. Silver, supra note 53, at 433. See also Condon, supra note 64, at A3 (noting the
unlikelihood of police pursing "charges against witnesses because authorities would have to
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den rests on the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a de-
fendant knew of the victim's peril and did not act. 10 2 "[T]he problem of
proving what was on a defendant's mind exists in nearly every criminal
prosecution," however, and would, thus, be neither a new nor a unique prob-
lem facing prosecutors. 103
In addition, the amount of knowledge a prosecutor would be required
to prove a witness possessed at the time of the crime would typically be
minimal. Existing duty-to-report statutes generally require that individuals
have only reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was committed.104 Case
law has further elaborated that such statutes do not require citizens who are
reporting the commission of a crime to possess as high of a degree of cer-
tainty as is required by the probable cause standard that police must satisfy
when making warrantless arrests.'0 5 In State v. LaPlante, °6 the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals explained that "to know" that a crime is occurring and that
a victim is exposed to harm "requires only that the actor believe that a spe-
cific fact exists.' 0°7 Thus, prosecutors would likely face little difficulty in
proving that witnesses possessed the requisite knowledge in cases such as
the Richmond High School gang rape, the Penn State child molestations,
and the Massachusetts bar rape, where the actions observed by witnesses
were so obvious and so heinous that no reasonable person could mistake
their criminal nature.
D. Hindrance to Prosecution
Some commentators argue that the enactment of a duty-to-report stat-
ute could create difficulties for prosecutors, as "quite often the prosecution
of the violent crime itself would depend upon the witness['s] cooperation
and testimony to have success."'0 8 One problem facing prosecutors is that a
duty-to-report statute may cause some witnesses to remain silent, out of fear
prove they knew the woman was in extreme danger"); Thompson, supra note 19, at 43 (duty-
to-assist laws have been challenged based on difficulty of people knowing whether they have
a duty to rescue).
102. See Kaplan, supra note 9, at 91 (acknowledging problem of proving a witness's
knowledge). See also supra note 95 discussing burden of proof requirements.
103. Silver, supra note 53, at 433.
104. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-115 (2011).
105. See Lunsford v. W. States Life Ins., 919 P.2d 899, 901 (Colo. App. 1996).
106. 521 N.W.2d 448 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
107. LaPlante, 521 N.W.2d at 451 (rejecting the appellant's claim that the wording of
Wisconsin's failure-to-aid statute made it difficult to know whether a witness must actually
have believed a crime was being committed before she had to report it). The court held that
the statute was not unconstitutionally vague as to its knowledge requirement. Id.
108. Email from Will Jones, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Pulaski Cnty., Ark., to author
(Mar. 7, 2011) (on file with author).
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that they themselves will be prosecuted.10 9 Once a witness is obtained for
use by the prosecution, an additional problem may arise. According to some
prosecutors, the effectiveness or credibility of a witness may be diminished
if the witness himself has been previously prosecuted in relation to the case
for which he is presently testifying."0 It is reasonably foreseeable that a
witness who has been prosecuted might not be as forthcoming with truthful
information as compared to a witness who had not previously been punished
by the same prosecutors seeking to later use his testimony."' Similarly, a
witness who has been granted immunity from prosecution in exchange for
his testimony may also be afforded less credibility by a jury."' On cross
examination, a defendant's counsel may question the witness about any
deals the prosecution agreed to make with the witness in exchange for his
testimony, thereby allowing a jury to know that the witness initially failed to
report the crime. 3
While some argue that a duty-to-report statute would be problematic
for prosecutors, others note that "there is a market for these laws, either as a
compromise charge or, for some, as leverage to be applied against recalci-
trant witnesses to serious crimes.""' Some prosecutors see "the threat of...
prosecution [a]s a bargaining chip in negotiations with potential witnesses
who hesitate to testify in the principal prosecution.""' 5 Additionally, as one
Arkansas prosecutor explained, in cases involving multiple defendants
where prosecutors are unable to charge a particular defendant with the crime
itself or as an accomplice, a duty-to-report statute may allow the state to at
least charge the defendant with the lesser offense of failure to report." 6 Ac-
cording to Pulaski County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Jennifer Waymack,
in many cases, three individuals may have committed a crime, but the state
has only enough evidence to charge two of them, rather than all three, be-
cause the third person claimed that he only witnessed the crime take place
but did nothing more than watch.' In those situations, she explained, "this
statute might allow [the state] to at least charge [the defendant] with some-
109. See Volokh, supra note 86, at 110.
110. See Email from Will Jones to author, supra note 108.
111. "If the sentence is severe, it would likely impact the willingness of the witness to
cooperate at trial." Email from Will Jones to author, supra note 108.
112. See Volokh,supra note 86, at 110; Yeager, supra note 11, at 37-38.
113. For example, a defense attorney might ask: Mr. Smith, isn't it true that the State
"'has agreed to drop criminal charges against you in exchange for your testimony against the
defendant?"' Volokh, supra note 86, at 110.
114. Yeager, supra note 11, at 38.
115. Yeager, supra note 11, at 37.
116. Email from Jennifer Waymack, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Pulaski Cnty., Ark., to
author (Mar. 18, 2011) (on file with author).
117. Email from Jennifer Waymack to author, supra note 116.
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thing. If we can't prove the [crime], maybe we can prove [he] didn't re-
port."'18
E. Ineffectiveness
An additional criticism of the duty-to-report statute is that it is ineffec-
tive."' One critic has declared that duty-to-assist legislation "allows for
emotional venting, but is nevertheless an exercise in futility in trying to
change human behavior."'' 20 In a similar tone, another commentator noted
that "[t]he imposition of [a] duty to report does not ... seem to prevent the
same two persons in the same situation from repeating their identical con-
duct." 121 On the other hand, however, a spokesperson for the Wisconsin At-
torney General's office has explained that even though it may provide little
use as a deterrent, Wisconsin's duty-to-assist statute nevertheless "has value
as [both] a moral guide ... and as a legal tool that can be used if needed."'' 2
While a reporting statute may not deter certain individuals from not re-
porting the crimes they witness, "deterrence is not the only motivation for [a
reporting] statute's implementation."'' 23 In many instances, people are often
more likely to assist or report crimes when they are aware that the law re-
quires them to do so, as opposed to when it does not. As one commentator
explained, "[t]he very existence of a criminal statute, even an unpopular
one, may compel obedience by virtue of the respect most people have for
the institution of law."' 24 Furthermore, results of social experiments have
shown that where people have been encouraged, even in subtle ways, to
report the crimes they witness, those individuals are much more likely to
actually report them. '25
V. CONCLUSION
As Representative Nick Lampson noted, "In a perfect world, reporting
crimes . . . would be common sense. This . . . is not a perfect world, and
Congress needs to pass legislation to make sure witnesses do report inci-
118. Email from Jennifer Waymack to author, supra note 116.
119. See ELDEFONSO & GCFFEY, supra note 93, at 38 (explaining that internal moral com-
punctions and societal p ,,sures are some sanctions "that are often more effective than crimi-
nal laws").
120. Stewart, supra note 57, at 391.
121. Kaplan, supra note 9, at 93.
122. Sanders, supra note 85.
123. King, supra note 8, at 638.
124. See Wenik, supra note 58, at 1798.
125. SKOGAN, supra note 59, at 338; Wenik, supra note 58, at 1789.
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dents of violence against [victims]."' 26 Although the law has traditionally
maintained that individuals have no duty to aid others, many states have
reacted to serious instances of indifference exhibited by witnesses of violent
crimes by enacting duty-to-assist and duty-to-report statutes. Because of the
policy implications, the benefits derived from witnesses reporting crimes,
and the ease with which individuals can report, it would be worthwhile for
Arkansas to follow this trend. While some steadfast followers of the com-
mon law no-duty-to-aid rule will undoubtedly remain opposed to the idea of
enforcing a legal duty to report, the benefits of enacting such legislation
outweigh the costs and potential enforceability issues. Furthermore, the fact
"that some cases may present problems is insufficient reason to deny recog-
nition of a rule compelling easy [assistance]."127 Ultimately, "if[,] because of
this statute[,] just one [witness], who normally would have kept on walking,
calls the police just in time to save a victim's life, none of the proof or pros-
ecution issues matter. It's worth enacting." 
128
Breanna Trombley*
126. Nick Lampson, New Congressional Caucus Helps to Protect Children, KLAAs ACT.
REv. (Marc Klaas Found. for Children, Sausalito, Cal.), Winter 1998, at 4, 4.
127. Lipkin, supra note 97, at 271.
128. Email from Jennifer Waymack, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Pulaski Cnty., Ark., to
author (Mar. 17, 2011) (on file with author).
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